Address poisoning around swaps: why history is a poor address book

Address poisoning tries to make an attacker-controlled address look like a familiar destination in your transaction history. The dangerous step is copying that lookalike address into a later real transfer or swap recipient field.

MetaMask’s address-poisoning guidance describes this history-based deception. Similar opening and ending characters are designed to pass a quick visual check.

Use an independent address source

For your own account, use the receiving wallet’s verified receive view. For another recipient, verify the full address through a trusted channel. Do not treat a recent explorer entry as an address book.

Zero-value or unfamiliar transfer records can create misleading context. Seeing an address near a genuine transaction does not prove you previously sent meaningful funds to it.

Check the final request

Compare the full recipient in the wallet and on the hardware display where supported. When swapping, distinguish the router destination from the final output recipient; the latter can be encoded inside the call.

A successful small payment to the intended address does not validate a later address copied from a poisoned history entry. Verify each actual request.

If you already sent output

Read the confirmed receipt and identify the true recipient. Recovery depends on control of that address or an applicable service mechanism; the lookalike resemblance does not give you control. Preserve evidence and avoid anyone claiming they can reverse the transfer by “cleaning” your transaction history.